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Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing
Criminal Due Process Requirements?
Stephanie Smitht
Gang-related violence is a serious problem facing communities
across the United States. Gangs have taken over neighborhoods and
have left innocent citizens terrified to enter public spaces.' Part of
what makes the gang problem in America so staggering is that con-
ventional crime-fighting techniques have proven particularly ineffec-
tive at reducing gang activity.' Faced with growing gang problems and
an inability to stop gangs through conventional techniques, communi-
ties have begun to turn to the civil justice system as an alternative.
For example, Cicero, Illinois, recently passed a gang free zones
ordinance allowing the town to exile gang members through civil ban-
ishment." The ordinance is believed to be the first of its kind in the na-
tion" and creates a unique civil remedy against gang violence that
could serve as a model for other communities.! Under the ordinance,
following a civil administrative hearing, gang members found by a
preponderance of the evidence to have engaged in gang-related
criminal activity are ordered to leave Cicero and face severe fines if
they return.6
While gang violence is a serious problem, there are limits to the
measures communities can take to combat gangs. Gang members'
constitutional rights constrain the range of alternatives available, as
evidenced by a recent Supreme Court decision striking down a Chi-
cago gang loitering ordinance even though the city claimed its en-
forcement reduced gang-related crime.7 Therefore, it is important to
examine the constitutionality of civil responses like the Cicero ordi-
nance before it is enforced or other cities decide to enact similar
t B.S. 1996, Rice University; J.D. Candidate 2001,The University of Chicago.
1 See notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
2 See note 10.
3 An Ordinance Providing for the Enforcement of Gang Free Zones in the Town of
Cicero ("Gang Free Zones Ordinance"), Ordinance No 111-99 (Apr 1999), amending Cicero
Code of Ordinances ch 25.
4 See Illinois Town Sues Gangs for Damages,AP (May 12,1999) (describing Cicero's gang
free zones law as "an extraordinary ordinance ... believed to be the first of its kind in the na-
tion").
5 See note 47 and accompanying text.
6 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(F)-(G), 25-300(c)(A)-(B).
7 City of Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41, 48-51 (1999) (holding that Chicago gang loitering
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague).
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measures. This Comment provides an analytic framework for evaluat-
ing civil responses to the gang problem in America. Civil responses
are attractive because they are less expensive and the government
faces a lower burden of proof;8 however, when the civil justice system
is used to administer serious penalties, the constitutional concerns out-
lined in this Comment should be considered.
This Comment argues that civil banishment is unconstitutional
because it actually administers a criminal penalty through a civil hear-
ing and therefore provides inadequate procedural safeguards to gang
members. Furthermore, even if civil banishment ordinances, such as
the one Cicero has enacted to combat gangs, were reclassified as
criminal and the relevant procedural safeguards that are currently
lacking were added, courts would still be unlikely to enforce banish-
ment of gang members because state laws often proscribe or severely
limit the use of banishment as a criminal penalty. Therefore, this
Comment argues that the Cicero ordinance should not be enforced,
and other cities should not adopt civil banishment procedures in the
ongoing war against gangs.
Part I of this Comment explores the growing problem of gang
violence in America, the ineffectiveness of conventional techniques
for combating this violence, and the creative techniques that cities
have begun to use to combat it. Part I also focuses on civil banishment
remedies, such as the ordinance passed by the town of Cicero. Part HI
discusses the nature of the distinction between civil and criminal pen-
alties and argues that civil banishment imposes a criminal penalty
though a civil hearing in violation of constitutional due process pro-
tections. Finally, Part III argues that courts would not enforce a civil or
criminal banishment of gang members in light of existing state ban-
ishment law.
L THE GROWTH OF GANG VIOLENCE IN AMERICA AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES
Gang violence is a staggering problem facing cities across Amer-
ica.9 Traditional criminal law enforcement methods have proven in-
adequate, and communities have had to respond with innovative law
8 See notes 60-61 and accompanying text (proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard lim-
ited to criminal context); note 65 and accompanying text (civil law techniques less expensive
than criminal procedures).
9 See Gregory S. Walston, Taking the Constitution at Its Word:" A Defense of the Use of
Anti-Gang Injunctions, 54 U Miami L Rev 47,47 (1999) (stating that gang violence is no longer
confined to inner cities but has "erupted to threaten virtually all neighborhoods in America");
Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governmens and the Battle for Public
Space, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev 477, 477 (1994) (stating that "gang violence has escalated to the
point of ubiquity, resulting in the mutilation and death of countless participants and innocent by-
standers").
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enforcement techniques. ' This Part briefly describes the overwhelm-
ing problem of gang violence in America and the creative responses of
communities to mounting urban chaos. This Part then focuses on civil
banishment remedies, such as the innovative gang free zones ordi-
nance passed by the town of Cicero, Illinois.
A. Gang Violence in America
Gang violence is a pervasive problem ravaging cities around the
country and leaving innocent citizens afraid to enter public spaces."
Recently Justice Thomas stated that in many cities, "gangs have virtu-
ally overtaken certain neighborhoods ... causing fear and lifestyle
changes among law-abiding residents."" Gangs reportedly exist in 94
percent of major cities and are present in at least 1,130 cities of all
sizes in America.3 One estimate reports that there are over sixteen
thousand gangs in the nation, over five hundred thousand gang mem-
bers, and nearly six hundred thousand annual gang-related crimes.4 In
Chicago alone, for example, it has been estimated that there were 132
criminal street gangs in 1996 and that between 1987 and 1994 these
gangs were "involved in 63,141 criminal incidents.""s
Part of what makes the gang problem so staggering is that con-
ventional crime-fighting techniques have been ineffective at stopping
gang activity. 6 Gang members establish control over areas of cities
and avoid arrest by only committing criminal offenses when they
know officers are not in the vicinity.7 While most people who intend
10 See Walston, 54 U Miami L Rev at 48 (cited in note 9) ("The rising problem of gang vio-
lence has overwhelmed conventional law enforcement techniques"); Matthew Mickle Werdegar,
Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Ur-
ban Street Gangs, 51 Stan L Rev 409, 410 & n 6 (1999) (noting that gang-related crime has
"proven highly resistant to traditional crime fighting methods" and citing numerous reports of
the failure of traditional law enforcement methods to effectively stop gangs); Boga, Note, 29
Harv CR-CL L Rev at 477 (cited in note 9) (noting that "there is growing sentiment that new
law enforcement techniques are necessary to stymie [ ] mounting urban disorder").
1n See Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial He-
gemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 Yale L J 2249,2249 (1998) (stating that gang mem-
bers are holding innocent people "hostage[ ] in the 'hood' leaving [them] afraid for their lives in
public spaces").
12 City of Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41,99-100 (1999) (Thomas dissenting) (also stating
that citizens are often relegated to the status of prisoners in their own homes) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
13 See Marilyn Tower Oliver, Gangs: Trouble in the Streets 7 (Enslow 1995).
14 See G. David Curry, Richard A. Ball, and Scott H. Decker, Estimating the National Scope
of Gang Crime from Law Enforcement Data, in C. Ronald Huff, ed, Gangs in America 21, 31
(Sage 2d ed 1996) (providing table with estimated numbers of gangs, members, and gang crimes
in cities of different sizes, for selected counties, and for the nation as a whole).
15 Morales, 527 US at 99 (Thomas dissenting) (discussing Chicago gang violence statistics).
16 See note 10.
17 Morales, 527 US at 45-47 (describing Chicago city council findings that led to the en-
actment of the invalidated Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibiting criminal street gang mem-
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to commit crimes will not do so if an officer is present, the prevalence
of gang crime coupled with gang members' ability to avoid being
caught makes fighting gangs with the traditional criminal justice sys-
tem difficult. Furthermore, gang members often intimidate potential
witnesses into refusing to testify or to report crimes in the first place."
While under-reporting is problematic in other areas of criminal law as
well, it seems particularly prevalent in the gang context given people's
fear of gangs.'9 Traditional methods of enforcement are still important,
but communities and prosecutors have found that they need "more
tools" in the fight against gangs because conventional criminal sanc-
tions have not reduced gang activity sufficiently.2
B. Community Responses
Faced with the inability to stop gang crime through conventional
techniques, communities have begun to turn to the civil justice system
as an alternative because of its more lenient standards of proof and
lower litigation costs.21 The most common innovative measure, first
championed in California, is an anti-gang civil injunction issued pur-
suant to courts' nuisance abatement powers.2 Under this approach,
cities identify gang turfs, gang members, and unlawful or antisocial
gang activity.2 The cities then file civil suits requesting that the court
declare the gang to be a public nuisance and enjoin the named defen-
dants, "numbering from a dozen to over three hundred," from engag-
ing in a variety of activities.2 While the injunctions are tailored to in-
dividual cases, many share common provisions such as prohibiting
gang members from committing illegal acts, from associating in public
with other gang members, and from harassing innocent third parties.2
bers from loitering).
18 Walston, 54 UI Miami L Rev at 48 (cited in note 9) (describing reasons that gang vio-
lence has "overwhelmed conventional law enforcement techniques").
19 See notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
20 Art Barnum, County Files Anti-Gang Suit: Unused State Law Cited in Civil Case Against
Tiventy Two West Chicago Defendants, Chi Trib 1 (Oct 5,1999) (quoting State Attorney's justifi-
cation for seeking a civil injunction against gang leaders in Cicero, Illinois barring their gang
activities).
21 See notes 61 and 65 and accompanying text.
22 See, for example, Walston, 54 U Miami L Rev at 48 (cited in note 9) (stating that in the
search for improved gang prevention, the most effective new technique is "enjoining the gang as
a public nuisance"); Werdegar, Note, 51 Stan L Rev at 411 (cited in note 10) (noting that Califor-
nia has "pioneered the use of public nuisance law to obtain sweeping civil injunctions" against
gang members); Stewart, Note, 107 Yale L J at 2249 (cited in note 11) (stating that many state
and local governments "have adopted new criminal and civil approaches designed to abate the
'nuisance' of gang existence").
23 Werdegar, Note, 51 Stan L Rev at 416-17 (cited in note 10) (discussing processes cities
use to obtain nuisance abatement injunctions against gangs).
24 Id.
2 Id at 417 (discussing typical provisions under nuisance abatement injunctions).
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These measures have been criticized as effectively banishing
street gang members from public spaces? without sufficient proof of
specific crimes and harming minority communities. Additionally, the
injunctions have been denounced as unconstitutionally vague2 and
violative of gang members' right to due process of law." However, a
divided California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of us-
ing injunctions to abate the public nuisance of gangs. Some commen-
tators have praised the measures,' and communities that have used
the injunctions have "declared them to be unqualified successes."' The
use of anti-gang injunctions has spread throughout the country, show-
ing the desire of communities to use the civil justice system to bolster
their efforts to reduce gang activity.
C. Civil Banishment and the Cicero Gang Free Zones Ordinance
In their search for innovative ways to combat gang crime, some
towns have not stopped at the filing of public nuisance suits. For ex-
ample, the town of Cicero, Illinois has adopted another, more aggres-
sive technique in its battle against street gangs: civil banishment of
gang members.33 Cicero has been faced with growing gang problems in
recent years. Last April, the town passed a controversial ordinance
26 See Boga, Note, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 492 (cited in note 9) (stating that municipali-
ties are "on the verge of decreeing that [street gang members] are not suitable for any public
space at any time").
27 See Stewart, Note, 107 Yale L J at 2250-51 (cited in note 11) (criticizing anti-gang civil
injunctions as harming minority communities and perpetuating "racial stigma and oppression").
28 See Werdegar, Note, 51 Stan L Rev at 427-28 (cited in note 10) (discussing problems of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement allowed under anti-gang injunctions). See also Gallo v
Acuna, 929 P2d 596,629-30 (Cal 1997) (Mosk dissenting) (concluding anti-gang injunction vio-
lated vagueness and overbreadth doctrines).
29 See Werdegar, Note, 51 Stan L Rev at 433-34 (cited in note 10) (discussing the constitu-
tional due process issues raised by the lack of procedural safeguards in civil anti-gang injunction
cases); Stewart, Note, 107 Yale L J at 2266-67 (cited in note 11) (noting that civil hearings entitle
defendants to "much less stringent and comprehensive" due process guarantees).
30 Acuna, 929 P2d at 608-14 (holding that the nuisance abatement injunction issued against
gang members did not violate their First Amendment rights of free speech or association and
was not impermissibly overbroad or vague).
31 Walston, 54 U Miami L Rev at 53 (cited in note 9) (stating that "[blecause it is unrea-
sonable to expect the common citizen to constantly be subjected to the inherent intimidation
and violence of criminal street gangs, anti-gang injunctions present the proper solution for re-
solving the conflict between the interests of public safety and the civil liberties of gang mem-
bers").
32 Werdegar, Note, 51 Stan L Rev at 411 (cited in note 10) (discussing the evident approval
of anti-gang injunctions by law enforcement, politicians, and the courts).
33 See Eric Slater, Suburb Gives Gang Members 60 Days to Leave, Austin American-
Statesman A12 (May 2,1999) (stating that measures taken by Cicero are "stricter than any now
on the books").
34 See Robert Becker and Rob D. Kaiser, Cicero Taking Its Gang Fight to Court: Suits Seek
Millions and Judicial Orders to Restrict Activities, Chi Trib I (May 12,1999) (reporting that police
have identified eighteen gangs in Cicero); Pam Belluck, Capone's Old Haven in Illinois Wants to
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making the town a gang free zone.35 Under the ordinance, the Superin-
tendent of Police can request that the Town Attorney bring a civil ac-
tion against a street gang member to banish the accused from Cicero.'
The complaint must allege evidence that the street gang member "en-
gaged in gang-related criminal activity in the community which pre-
sents a clear and present danger to the public order and safety."" The
hearing on the complaint is conducted in front of an administrative
hearing officer designated by the Town Board, not a criminal court
judge." The ordinance does not indicate how the hearing officer is se-
lected or what position the hearing officer holds in the town. "If the
hearing officer finds that the accused is a gang member and has en-
gaged in gang-related criminal activity," the accused is effectively ban-
ished from the town by an order to "vacate his residence."9 The order
to vacate is to be enforced by the Superintendent of Police, and if the
gang member stays within Cicero or subsequently reenters Cicero, he
is fined $500 for each day he is present in the town. Although a one-
year probationary period may be granted if the accused renounces all
gang activity,1 the banishment from Cicero lasts indefinitely under the
ordinance, and there is no provision allowing the accused to seek per-
mission to visit the town for any reason.
In the hearing under the ordinance, the rules of evidence do not
apply. For example, "hearsay shall be admissible" to determine if the
accused has been involved in gang-related activity."0 More importantly,
during this civil proceeding, the town only has to prove involvement in
gang-related activity by a preponderance of the evidence,3 lower than
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required in criminal cases."
Evict Gang Members, Deseret News A6 (May 9, 1999) (stating that Cicero officials reported
sixty-four shootings and fifteen homicides in 1998 and twenty-four shootings and two homicides
in the first four months of 1999, almost all gang related). In comparison, approximately one-
quarter, or 175, of Chicago's 700 homicides in 1998 were gang related. See Steve Mills, One Step
to Reform, Two Steps Back- Corruption, Brutality Charges Still Tarnish Police, Chi Trib 1 (Feb 11,
1999).
35 See Tammy Webber, Illinois Suburb OKs Anti-Gang Ordinance, AP (Apr 28, 1999) (re-
porting that the Cicero ordinance making the town a gang free zone was passed by 95 percent of
the voters and unanimously enacted by the Town Board).
36 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(C).
37 Id.
38 Id § 25-300(a)(E). However, a gang member can file an appeal from an order to leave
Cicero with the Circuit Court of Cook County. See id § 25-300(a)(J).
39 Id § 25-300(a)(G).
40 Id § 25-300(a)(G),25-300(c)(A)-(B).
41 Id § 25-300(a)(H). See also § 25-300(a)(I) (for individuals sixteen and younger the ordi-
nance allows for a probationary period if the parents of the accused agree that the accused will
cease gang activity).
42 Id § 25-300(a)(E).
43 Id § 25-300(a)(F).
44 See note 61 and accompanying text.
1466 [67:1461
2000] Civil Banishment of Gang Members 1467
However, the accused does have a "right to discovery and to be repre-
sented by an attorney" at the hearing."
Even though Cicero has not enforced the ordinance to date, the
ordinance has nonetheless had effects on the community. In the wake
of its passage and the surrounding publicity, it has been reported that
people have left Cicero to avoid potential enforcement actions.6 Fur-
thermore, other cities have considered adopting similar measures and
Cicero hopes to be a model to other communities throughout the na-
tion.47
When Cicero passed the ordinance, many thought it was an ex-
treme, and likely unconstitutional, measure.4 Some commentators
thought that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague,9 while oth-
ers thought it impermissible because it punishes someone for his
status.5 Other commentators criticized the treatment of minors under
the ordinance" and expressed reservations about pushing gang mem-
bers into surrounding communities." Still others expressed concern
that the ordinance would work along racial lines.53 However, none of
45 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(E).
46 See Rob D. Kaiser, Suits Targeting Gangs Have Town Split in Two, ChiTrib I (metro sec-
tion) (May 13, 1999) (relaying anecdotal evidence that six or seven people have left Cicero al-
ready out of fear of banishment); Slater, Suburb Gives Gang Members 60 Days to Leave, Austin
American-Statesman at A12 (cited in note 33) (reporting that Cicero town president Betty
Loren-Maltese thinks a lot of families will "see the handwriting on the wall and will leave").
47 See John Flink, Alderman Urges Cicero-style Law to Battle Gangs, Chi Trib 3 (metro sec-
tion) (May 19, 1999) (reporting Waukegan alderman suggesting that town look into prohibiting
gangs); Betty Loren-Maltese, Ridding Cicero of Gangs, Chi Trib 14 (May 4, 1999) (quoting
Cicero town president stating that Cicero's ordinance will serve as a model for other communi-
ties and that the town had already received over thirty requests from other municipalities for
copies of the ordinance).
48 John Kass, Cicero Keeping Streets, Alleys Safe from Little Hoopsters, Chi Trib 3 (May 18,
1999) (stating that, because of the ordinance, constitutional scholars think Cicero's town presi-
dent is "wacky").
49 See, for example, Stephen E. Sachs, When Only "Good People" Have Rights, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch B15 (Aug 10, 1999) (stating that the Cicero ordinance is likely to be unconstitu-
tional because its expansive definition of street gang "opens up the door for arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement" and quoting Northwestern University law professor Dan Polsby as
saying that "[s]ome ordinances are unconstitutional, but this one is unconstitutional as hell").
50 Town's Anti-Gang Laws Raise Eyebrows: Legal Experts Believe Attempts to Kick Out All
Gangsters are Unconstitutional, Salt Lake Trib D1 (Apr 29,1999) (quoting the executive director
of the ACLU as stating that the ordinance is unconstitutional "because [it] charge[s] somebody
for their status[,] ... not a crime").
51 See, for example, Editorial, Gang Busting, Daily Athenaeum (Apr 29,1999) (noting that
when gang members under age eighteen are forced to leave under the ordinance, their parents
have to "move out with them or send them to live with out-of-town relatives").
52 See, for example, Brian Knowlton, Cicero, Illinois to Gangs: Get Out of Town, Intl Herald
Trib 3 (Apr 30, 1999) (expressing concern that the ordinance allows Cicero to "foist" its prob-
lems on other towns).
53 See, for example, Illinois Town Sues Gangs for Damages, AP (cited in note 4) (quoting
University of Chicago Professor Stephen Schulhofer as saying that "[w]hat you worry about is
when something like this gives (the town) the power to sweep every Latin kid off the street");
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these reports focused on the fact that the ordinance is imposing a
criminal penalty through a civil hearing. Other cities that model the
Cicero ordinance could likely draft their ordinances so as to avoid
many of the constitutional challenges, such as vagueness. However, the
criminal-civil distinction problem implicates the two most important
features of Cicero's ordinance that other communities could not sim-
ply draft around: the civil nature of the proceeding and the punish-
ment of banishment. This Comment argues that civil banishment ex-
ceeds the limit on the extent to which the civil system can be used to
supplant the criminal system in combating gangs, because banishment
is an extremely severe punishment. Furthermore, this Comment ar-
gues in Part III that banishment of gang members from an entire city
would likely be struck down under existing state law even if criminal
procedural protections were provided. Therefore, other cities model-
ing Cicero's ordinance could not draft around the two central features
of Cicero's ordinance to save their measures from invalidity.
II. CIVIL BANISHMENT IMPOSES A CRIMINAL PENALTY THROUGH A
CIVIL HEARING
For years the law has distinguished between criminal and civil
proceedings.- This Part details the tests that courts and commentators
have used to determine if an action is criminal or civil and explores
recent Supreme Court applications of these tests. Although the dis-
tinction between civil and criminal actions has been rapidly collapsing
in recent years,5 this Part argues that it is still important to draw the
distinction in many cases, especially where a serious loss of liberty
such as banishment is at stake. This Part then argues that civil banish-
ment is a criminal penalty couched as a civil one, and that a court
should not allow this deprivation of constitutional procedural protec-
tions guaranteed in criminal proceedings.
A. The Criminal-Civil Distinction
The division between criminal and civil law is deeply ingrained in
English and American law, and the Supreme Court continues to take
Slater, Suburb Gives Gang Members 60 Days to Leave, Austin American-Statesman at A12 (cited
in note 33) (reporting that opponents of the ordinance are concerned that it will "work along ra-
cial lines" against the influx of Latinos into predominantly white Cicero). But see Editorial, Try
Again on Gangs, Chi Sun-Times 31 (June 14,1999) (stating that among those targeted by the or-
dinance are members of a Caucasian gang, the Nobel Knights).
54 See, for example, Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 Buff Crim L
Rev 679, 679 (1999) (stating that "[o]ne of the most profound boundaries our justice system has
drawn is that between the terrain of civil and criminal law").
55 See notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
56 See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
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the distinction seriously.' The distinction is important because many
constitutional procedural safeguards are only available in criminal
proceedings. For example, the Self-Incrimination Clause in the Fifth
Amendment is expressly limited to "any criminal case,"' and the Sixth
Amendment protections of the rights to a speedy trial, trial by jury,
confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process, and assistance of
counsel are only available to the accused in "criminal prosecutions.""
Furthermore, other constitutional protections, such as the Double
Jeopardy Clause protection against repeat punishment for the same
offense and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
have been limited to the criminal context by the Supreme Court.0
Therefore, properly classifying a proceeding as criminal or civil is ex-
tremely important to determine the constitutional rights of defen-
dants."
The paradigmatic distinction between the two types of proceed-
ings is that the criminal law is punitive while the civil law is compensa-
tory. However, this paradigm of the criminal-civil distinction has been
rapidly collapsing3 in large part due to the recognition that the civil
system can be used, not only to compensate, but also to deter undesir-
able behavior in the same way that the criminal system deters! Many
Civil Law, 101 Yale L J 1795,1803 (1992) (discussing historic division between criminal and civil
law dating back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries).
57 See, for example, Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on
the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J
Contemp Legal Issues 69, 78 (1996) (stating that the Court takes the distinction seriously and
that there are "good grounds for its durability").
58 US Const Amend V.
59 US Const Amend VI.
60 See United States v Ward, 448 US 242, 248 (1980) (stating that these protections "while
not explicitly limited to one context or the other, have been so limited" by the Court to the
criminal context).
61 See, for example, John C. Coffee, Paradigms Lost. The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil
Law Models-And What Can Be Done about It, 101 Yale L J 1875,1888 (1992) (stating that civil
penalties "could provide the means for evading constitutional safeguards" guaranteed in the
criminal context).
62 See, for example, Mann, 101 Yale LJ at 1799,1807-09 (cited in note 56) (discussing the
respective paradigmatic purposes of criminal and civil law); Coffee, 101 Yale L J at 1884 (cited in
note 61) (stating that "the criminal law prohibits, while the civil law prices"); Mary M. Cheh,
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understand-
ing and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L J 1325, 1354-55 (1991)
(noting that commentators state that "recompense of the injured ... is the hallmark of a civil
proceeding" while criminal punishment is traditionally for seeking retribution).
63 See, for example, Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and
the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Georgetown L J 775,783-84 (1997) (discussing the in-
creasing "blurring or destabilization" of the criminal-civil distinction); Coffee, 101 Yale L J at
1875 (cited in note 61) (stating that the "line between civil and criminal penalties is rapidly col-
lapsing"); Cheh, 42 Hastings L J at 1327 (cited in note 62) (stating that the "current phenomenon
of civil remedies blending with criminal sanctions never has been more actively or consciously
pursued").
64 See United States v Ursery, 518 US 267,292 (1996) (noting that deterrence "may serve
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legislative bodies are now turning to civil law techniques to stop anti-
social behavior because they are less expensive and unencumbered by
the rigorous constitutional protections associated with criminal trials.6'
However, given the lack of many procedural safeguards in a civil pro-
ceeding, it is still important to ensure that criminal sanctions are not
being administered through a civil proceeding in violation of a defen-
dant's constitutional rights. It is helpful when making the criminal-civil.
distinction to recognize that core criminal remedies are incarceration
and the stigma associated with criminal conviction, while the core civil
remedies are injunctions or monetary damages to compensate for in-
juries.' There are heightened procedural protections in the criminal
justice system because criminal penalties typically deprive defendants
of more than just property, which implicates larger liberty interests.
Some commentators have suggested that constitutional criminal pro-
cedural protections should be applied to a proceeding, even if it is la-
beled as civil, if the punishments are as severe as those authorized by
criminal laws.6
B. Tests for Determining the Nature of a Proceeding
There is no simple test to use when determining if an action clas-
sified as civil is "really" criminal. In United States v Ward,a' the Su-
civil as well as criminal goals"). See also Mann, 101 Yale L J at 1845-47 (cited in note 56) (dis-
cussing the rise of deterrence theory in law); Steiker, 85 Georgetown L J at 784-87 (cited in note
63) (discussing how the growth of "law and economics" has challenged the distinction between
civil and criminal sanctions by recasting them as "related parts of a unitary scheme of state con-
trol of private behavior"); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 187,190 (Little, Brown
3d ed 1986) (arguing that tort remedies and criminal sanctions can both be effective deterrents).
See also Steiker, 85 Georgetown L J at 787-97 (cited in note 63) (arguing that changes in cogni-
tive and behavioral sciences and the similarity between modem modes of criminal punishment
and civil regulation have also led to the collapse of the criminal-civil distinction in many cases).
65 See, for example, Steiker, 85 Georgetown L J at 780 (cited in note 63) (stating that the
high cost of criminal procedure has led legislators to pursue "civil avenues to address what might
more plausibly be classified as criminal conduct"); Cheh, 42 Hastings L J at 1345 (cited in note
62) (noting that the use of civil remedies is growing in part because they are "easier to use, more
efficient, and less costly than criminal prosecutions").
66 See Mann, 101 Yale L J at 1809 (cited in note 56) (discussing the paradigmatic differ-
ences between criminal and civil remedies). See also Kennedy v Mendoia-Martinez, 372 US 144,
168 (1962) (holding that whether the sanction is an affirmative disability or restraint is a factor in
determining whether it is criminal); Coffee, 101 Yale L J at 1878 (cited in note 61) (noting crimi-
nal law's goal of maximizing stigma and censure); Cheh, 42 Hastings L J at 1352 (cited in note
62) (noting that commentators have argued that the stigma and social condemnation associated
with criminal proceedings distinguish them from civil ones).
67 See Cheh, 42 Hastings LJ at 1350-51 (cited in note 62) (noting the appeal of the "sanc-
tion equivalency approach" but also the flaw in the approach because huge punitive damage
awards have long been accepted as civil); George Fletcher, Comment, The Concept of Punitive
Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U Chi
L Rev 290,292 (1965) (arguing for criminal procedural protections when there are "grave" pen-
alties).
68 448 US 242 (1980).
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preme Court outlined a two-part test to determine whether the action
should be considered civil or criminal: (1) did the legislative body in-
dicate "either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the
other"; and (2) despite the civil label, is the "statutory scheme ... so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [legislative] inten-
tion." Demonstrating a willingness to defer to the legislature, the
Court stated that "only the clearest proof" will suffice to override leg-
islative intent under the second part of the test and transform a pro-
ceeding denominated as civil into a criminal one.70
Under Ward's first prong, a court must ascertain the legislature's
preference. Some commentators have dubbed this test the "legislative
label approach" because the Court will usually ratify the legislature's
decision to classify an action as civil or criminal.7' However, even pro-
ponents of the legislative label approach admit that there are types of
cases that are appropriately classified as criminal regardless of legisla-
tive intent.' For example, one commentator has argued that if the
punishment in the proceeding is only consistent "with the view that
the underlying conduct punished was criminal," then the proceeding
should provide criminal constitutional protections.7 Therefore, it is
important to examine a proceeding to determine ift despite its civil
legislative label, it is in fact a criminal proceeding for the purpose of
constitutional protections.
In Hudson v United States,"7 the Court reaffirmed the Ward rule75
and stated that the seven-factor test from Kennedy v Mendoza-
Martinez76 serves as a "useful guidepost[ ]" when determining whether,
despite the legislative label, a civil remedy is in fact a criminal pen-
69 Id at 248-49 (stating that whether a penalty is civil or criminal "is a matter of statutory
construction").
70 Id at 249.
71 See Klein, 2 Buff Crim L Rev at 683 (cited in note 54) (stating that the Supreme Court
in the last few terms has routinely "bless[ed] whatever label a legislature places on a sanction");
Cheh, 42 Hastings L J at 1330,1359-60 (cited in note 62) (advocating legislative label approach
because it provides a clear test for making the criminal-civil distinction and because it recognizes
that criminal proceedings are public statements of societal boundaries and moral rules and
therefore only something the public, through the legislature, has designated as criminal should be
treated as such by a court).
72 See Ward, 448 US at 248-49 (noting that there will be cases in which the legislative in-
tention of creating a civil penalty will be negated); Cheh, 42 Hastings L J at 1361-64 (cited in
note 62) (noting that there are two types of cases that should be considered criminal regardless
of the legislative label).
73 See Cheh, 42 Hastings L J at 1363 (cited in note 62) (stating that if the punishment "so
dramatically expresses societal disapproval that its imposition can only be legitimated through
the ceremony of a criminal conviction," the legislative label should not be followed in making
the criminal-civil distinction). See also Fletcher, Comment, 32 U Chi L Rev at 292 (cited in note
67).
74 522 US 93 (1997).
75 Id at 96 (reaffirming the rule established in Ward).
76 372 US 144 (1963).
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alty.n In Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court developed a seven-
factor comparative test for courts to use to determine whether a civil
proceeding is in reality a criminal one requiring attendant constitu-
tional procedural safeguards."' The seven factors are: (1) "[w]hether
the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2)
"whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3)
"whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4)
"whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it"; and
(7) "whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned."'
Despite considerable deference to the legislature, the Supreme
Court has allowed serious sanctions to be imposed through civil pro-
ceedings only when the sanction was limited to the deprivation of
property or when the sanction has historically been administered
through civil proceedings.
In a series of cases, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to
allow punitive forfeitures of property through the civil system. In
Bennis v Michigan," the Court allowed the civil confiscation of an in-
nocent party's property that had been used without her knowledge by
someone else in the commission of a crime.1 In United States v Urs-
ery,u the Court held that a federal conviction for manufacturing mari-
juana, following a civil forfeiture action seizing property used to facili-
tate the same offense, did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause be-
cause civil forfeitures "do not constitute 'punishment' for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 'u Finally, in Hudson, the Court held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar a criminal prosecution for
77 522 US at 99-100 (noting usefulness of Mendoza-Martinez factors but also stressing that
"'only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty") (citations omitted).
78 372 US at 167-69 (holding that the loss of citizenship for draft dodging was a criminal
punishment that required a "criminal trial and all its incidents" and articulating a seven-factor
test to determine if a statute is penal or regulatory in character).
79 372 US at 168-69.
8o 516 US 442 (1996).
81 Id at 452-53 (holding that civil forfeiture was appropriate because it "serve[d] a deter-
rent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose" regardless of the party's innocence in the crime
committed in her car).
82 518 US 267 (1996).
83 Id at 270-71,287-92 (holding that "in rem civil forfeitures are neither 'punishment' nor
criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause" because Congress intended the proceed-
ings to be civil and because, given the proceedings' important non-punitive, deterrence goals,
there is little proof that the proceedings are "so punitive in form and effect as to render them
criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary").
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violating banking statutes subsequent to the civil imposition of mone-
tary penalties and debarment for the same conduct.Y
The Court has also ratified the civil label of a proceeding when it
reflects a long-standing legislative and judicial practice of administer-
ing a particular sanction through the civil justice system. In Kansas v
Hendricks," the Court held that potentially indefinite involuntary civil
commitment of sexually violent predators did "not establish criminal
proceedings" and therefore did not violate the Double Jeopardy or Ex
Post Facto Clauses.6
While the Court has narrowed the gap between the civil and
criminal justice systems through these cases imposing serious sanc-
tions, it continues to assess each proceeding under the Ward test. Thus,
the banishment of gang members in a legislatively labeled civil pro-
ceeding must still be carefully evaluated to determine whether it is in
reality a criminal sanction depriving defendants of procedural safe-
guards. This Comment argues that, despite the Supreme Court's def-
erence to legislative intent and its reluctance to provide criminal pro-
cedural protections to proceedings denominated as civil, the civil ban-
ishment of gang members is so extreme that it should be recognized as
a criminal punishment.
C. Application of the Court's Tests to the Cicero Ordinance and
Civil Banishment
Despite its civil label, this Part argues that civil banishment pur-
suant to measures such as Cicero's gang free zones ordinance is so pu-
nitive in purpose and in effect that courts applying the Ward test
would ignore the civil legislative label and provide the constitutional
protections of criminal proceedings to defendants.
, In determining the constitutionality of civil banishment, the Ward
test appliesY The result of part one of the test will be clear; in passing
the ordinance, the legislature will demonstrate its intent to create a
civil proceeding. For example, the Cicero ordinance unambiguously
states the legislature's preference under part one of the Ward test. The
84 522 US at 103-05 (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated by subsequent
criminal prosecution, even though the prior civil proceedings deprived the defendants of their
livelihood, because Congress intended the monetary penalties and debarment sanctions to be
civil in nature and there was not the "clearest proof' required to show that the penalties and de-
barments were in fact criminal).
85 521 US 346 (1997).
86 Id at 361-69 (holding that Kansas statute providing for the civil confinement of sexually
violent predators did not establish criminal proceedings under the Ward test because the state's
intent to create a civil proceeding was clear from the placement of the law in the probate code,
rather than in the criminal code, and the defendant had failed to "satisfy [the] heavy burden" of
showing that the statute was so punitive as to negate the state's intention).
87 See text accompanying notes 68-70, 74-77.
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preamble to the ordinance states that the town's intent was "to create
a civil remedy against street gangs and their members" because their
activities "present[ ] a clear and present danger to public order and
safety."'' Having attempted to create a civil penalty under the first part
of the Ward test, the analysis proceeds to the second part.9
Under this part of the Ward test, the legislature's intent will only
be negated where there is the "clearest proof' that the "statutory
scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [legisla-
tive] intention."'" Under a straightforward application of this part, civil
banishment is punitive enough to negate the legislative label. Banish-
ing someone from a town is far more serious than typical civil penal-
ties.9 ' Furthermore, as will be discussed in Part III, banishing gang
members under the ordinance would likely be found to be excessive
under current banishment law and is unlikely actually to achieve the
goal of reducing overall gang-related activity. Banishing gang mem-
bers also seems excessively punitive in light of available alternatives,
such as criminally prosecuting the underlying behavior or seeking civil
public nuisance injunctions against the gang members' behavior itself
without banishing individuals from their homes. Therefore, given the
excessive nature of banishment, a court would likely find that the
clear proof needed to negate the civil label is present and criminal
procedural protections should be provided despite the legislative in-
tent to create a civil proceeding.
As an alternative to this facial application of the second part of
the Ward test, the Mendoza-Martinez factors9 provide a list of consid-
erations to use in making this determination." First, banishment in-
volves "an affirmative disability or restraint"' even though it does not
involve the paradigmatic criminal punishments of imprisonment or
detention.9 For example, under the Cicero ordinance, accused gang
members whom the hearing officer finds to have engaged in gang-
related criminal activity are "ordered to vacate [their] residence[s]" in
Cicero," and are fined $500 a day if they are found within the town
88 Gang Free Zones Ordinance, Preamble (emphasis added).
89 Ward, 448 US at 248-49 (stating that the first part of test to determine if a proceeding is
criminal or civil involves determining the legislative intent and that if the intent is to create a
civil penalty, then the second part of the test must be considered).
90 Id.
91 See Mann, 101 Yale L J at 1809 (cited in note 56) (discussing the paradigmatic criminal
and civil remedies).
92 See text accompanying notes 78-79.
93 See text accompanying notes 74-77.
94 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168.
95 See Mann, 101 Yale L J at 1809-10 (cited in note 56) (discussing the paradigmatic crimi-
nal and civil remedies).
96 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(G).
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thereafter.7 One could argue that this is not a physical restraint on
gang members because they are free to live in any other community
they choose. However, while the banishment may not be a typical
physical restraint, it does impose a disability on gang members by re-
straining them from living in Cicero. Furthermore, this may not be an
affirmative disability or restraint because a gang member, in theory,
could pay the fine and stay within Cicero. However, the high daily fine
for remaining in the town effectively expels gang members because
they are unlikely to be willing to incur the high cost associated with
remaining there. Therefore, civil banishment is effectively removing
individuals from the entire community just as imprisonment would.
This is a greater affirmative disability or restraint than a large onetime
fine or civil forfeiture.
Second, banishment has "historically been regarded as punish-
ment."'" Justice Brewer stated that "banishment of a citizen is punish-
ment, and punishment of the severest kind." Black's Law Dictionary
defines banishment as a "punishment inflicted upon criminals, by
compelling them to leave a country for a specified period of time, or
for life."' .. Typically, banishment is imposed as a condition of probation
or parole, ' further indicating that it is historically associated with pun-
ishment.
The third factor to consider is whether sanctions pursuant to the
ordinance "come[ ] into play only on a finding of scienter."" The
Cicero ordinance does not directly contain any mens rea or subjective
mental element requirement before an accused gang member may be
banished from the town. However, the ordinance does require that the
hearing officer find that the accused "has engaged in gang-related
criminal activity" before ordering him to leave Cicero." Although the
analysis under this factor may initially seem unclear, it ultimately
points to negating legislative intent to create a civil penalty because
the gang-related criminal activity necessary for banishment would re-
quire scienter. The scienter requirement would exist in any civil ban-
97 Id § 25-300(c)(A)-(B).
98 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168.
99 United States v Ju Toy, 198 US 253,269 (1905) (Brewer dissenting) (condemning Court's
denial of writ of habeas corpus to individual forbidden from reentering United States). See also
Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 555 (Taylor & Maury 2d ed 1854) ("[I]f a banishment [from a country] be not a pun-
ishment .... it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.").
100 Black's Law Dictionary 97 (West 6th ed 1991) (emphasis added).
101 See Win. Garth Snider, Banishment. The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Aboli-
tion under the First Amendment, 24 New Eng J on Crim and Civ Confinement 455, 456 (1998)
(noting that banishment is "often a condition of probation or parole" and discussing implications
for how banishment is applied).
102 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168.
103 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(G).
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ishment ordinance that was premised on prior criminal behavior as
the condition to initiate banishment proceedings.
The next factor to consider is whether the sanction will "promote
the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence..'.
The Cicero ordinance seeks to promote the traditional aims of crimi-
nal law rather than the traditionally compensatory aims of civil law.05
The ordinance seeks to deter gang-related activity that is viewed as a
danger to the public safety."' The ordinance is aimed at reducing risks
caused by gang members' activity and seeks retribution for past gang-
related criminal activity. It is not focused on compensation for actual
injuries because the moving party, the town,'07 does not seek any dam-
ages under the ordinance.
The fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor focuses on whether the ordi-
nance applies to behavior that is "already a crime.' 'ln This factor is
somewhat difficult to apply literally because civil banishment does not
usually penalize specific behavior. For example, the Cicero ordinance
allows the town to banish gang members if they are found to have en-
gaged in any gang-related criminal activity that "presents a clear and
present danger to the public order and safety."'" However, this also
argues for placing the ordinance on the criminal, rather than civil, side
of the criminal-civil distinction because the ordinance can only apply
if the accused has been involved in a dangerous activity that could be
punished criminally.
The sixth factor to consider is whether an alternative purpose for
civil banishment may be assigned."° Banishment may serve a broad
deterrent purpose in addition to stopping an individual's conduct. For
example, in addition to its primary purpose of ridding Cicero of exist-
ing gang members, the Cicero ordinance seeks to deter others from
becoming gang members or committing gang-related criminal of-
fenses. This deterrent purpose is a traditional goal of criminal law.
However, an alternative deterrent purpose of the ordinance is insuffi-
cient to negate the legislative intent and turn the civil sanction into a
104 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168. This continues to be a factor; however, the presence
of a deterrent aim alone will be "insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence may
serve civil as well as criminal goals." Hudson, 522 US at 105 (internal quotations omitted).
105 See notes 62 and 66 and accompanying text.
106 Gang Free Zones Ordinance, Preamble.
107 Id § 25-300(a)(A), (C) (stating that the Superintendent of Police shall file a hearing re-
quest under the ordinance and the Town Attorney shall draft the complaint). Having a govern-
ment entity as the moving party is a traditional characteristic of the criminal rather than civil law.
See Mann, 101 Yale L J at 1812 (cited in note 56) (discussing the difference in the moving party
in criminal and civil proceedings and noting that the government is typically the moving party in
a criminal proceeding while private parties typically control a civil one).
108 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168.
109 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(G).
110 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168-69.
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criminal one.' Therefore, the results under this factor standing alone
do not argue in favor of declaring the Cicero ordinance to be criminal
in nature.
The final Mendoza-Martinez factor asks whether the ordinance
"appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." 2
Gang-related crime and violence is a major problem that has resisted
traditional law enforcement techniques," and the goals of deterring
others from becoming gang members or committing gang-related
crimes and protecting the community are clearly admirable and desir-
able. However, banishing people from a town seems to be an extreme
measure to accomplish these purposes. As will be discussed in Part III,
banishing gang members from a town would likely be found to be ex-
cessive under current state banishment law and is unlikely to actually
achieve the goal of reducing overall gang-related activity. So banishing
someone from an entire town, even a gang member, also argues in fa-
vor of denominating the punishment as criminal because it is exces-
sive in relation to the alternative deterrent purposes of the ordinance.
Therefore, the results of the analysis under all but one of the seven
Mendoza-Martinez factors argue in favor of the position that Cicero is
imposing a criminal punishment through a civil hearing.
Advocates of civil banishment might point to recent Supreme
Court decisions allowing the imposition of serious sanctions through
the civil system, but reliance on these precedents would be misguided.
As noted in Part II.B, the Court has allowed the legislature to estab-
lish civil forfeiture proceedings that complement criminal penalties,
but the Court has been reluctant to expand these civil sanctions be-
yond taking property. Civil banishment goes beyond the simple levy-
ing of a fine or the taking of property; it deprives the defendant of
freedom in the same way revoking a person's citizenship or imprison-
ing her deprives her of freedom.
An advocate of civil banishment might point to Hendricks as the
strongest case for upholding civil banishment. In Hendricks, the Court
held that potentially indefinite involuntary civil commitment of sexu-
ally violent predators was constitutionally permissible."' Hendricks is
inapposite. First, the Kansas statute at issue in Hendricks provides for
civil commitment only of a person who "suffers from a mental abnor-
mality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to en-
Ill See Hudson, 522 US at 105 (stating that the "mere presence" of a deterrent purpose "is
insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals")
(internal quotations omitted).
112 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 169.
113 See Part I.A.
114 Hendricks, 521 US at 361-69.
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gage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.""- The civil system has
traditionally been used to commit the mentally ill since colonial
times. "6 The legislature in Hendricks did not attempt to implement a
civil statute that inflicted a punishment that is disfavored in the civil
justice system. By contrast, as discussed in Part III below, banishment
has long been disfavored, even in the criminal context, and it has
never been used extensively like the commitment of the mentally ill.
In Hendricks, the Court stressed that Kansas had "disavowed any
punitive intent""'7 in the law allowing for the civil commitment of
sexually violent predators and that the law did "not implicate either of
the two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or de-
terrence.""8 The Court found that Kansas was "not seeking retribution
for a past misdeed" because it used past criminal conduct solely as
evidence of "mental abnormality" or evidence that the person would
likely be dangerous in the future."9
On the other hand, civil banishment does implicate the tradi-
tional goals of criminal punishment. For example, the Cicero ordi-
nance requires that the hearing officer find that the accused has "en-
gaged in gang-related criminal activity '' " and does not specify that the
past conduct is to be used only as evidence of potential future danger-
ousness. It seems instead that 'Cicero is seeking retribution for past
criminal gang activity.
The Court in Hendricks also found that Kansas did not intend the
civil commitment to serve the traditional deterrent purpose of crimi-
nal punishment because the people Kansas sought to confine were "by
definition" incapable of "exercising adequate control over their be-
havior.' ' 2' The threat of confinement is therefore unable to deter such
persons.'= In contrast, the Cicero ordinance serves the traditional
criminal law objective of deterring gang-related activity by providing
probation if the accused agrees to cease participation in illegal gang
activity and threatening banishment if he does not.' There is no indi-
cation that the gang members are not capable of being deterred.
115 Id at 357 (discussing the Kansas civil commitment statute).
116 Id at 357 (noting that the Court has "consistently upheld" civil commitment of "people
who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and
safety" and listing sources that trace the history of civil commitment in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries and colonial America).
117 Id at 368.
118 Id at 361-62.
119 Id at 362.
120 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(G).
121 Hendricks, 521 US at 362.
122 Id at 363.
123 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a) (H).
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The Hendricks Court also indicated that the state did not intend
for commitment to last any longer than necessary and did not intend
for the commitment to be punitive. ' The Court stressed that civil con-
finement under the Kansas law was only potentially, and not definitely,
of unlimited duration, with a provision for immediate release upon a
showing that the confined person is "safe to be at large. 'l In contrast,
civil banishment would be for unlimited duration unless a city estab-
lished a system to readmit gang members who demonstrate that they
are no longer engaged in gang activity. For example, the Cicero ordi-
nance indefinitely banishes gang members who do not opt for the one-
year probation period and has no provision for readmitting them to
the city if they later renounce gang activity.n
Finally, Kansas provided "numerous procedural and evidentiary
protections" to confine the civil commitments to "only a narrow class
of particularly dangerous individuals."'2' While one could argue that
the provision of heightened procedural protections makes the Kansas
statute more criminal in nature than the Cicero ordinance, the Court
saw these protections as demonstrating the care that Kansas was tak-
ing to narrow the scope of civil commitment under the act.' In con-
trast, the Cicero ordinance specifically provides low evidentiary stan-
dards '2 and indicates the town's intent to cast a broad net and remove
as many gang members as possible. Other civil banishment ordinances
would have to share this feature of the Cicero ordinance to have a suf-
ficient impact given the large number of gang members in many
communities. Furthermore, one could argue that with Kansas already
providing "strict procedural safeguards,"'" the Court did not have to
be as concerned that Kansas was depriving people of constitutional
criminal procedural protections.
Taken together, these differences indicate that there is more
"clear proof' that the Cicero ordinance establishes criminal proceed-
ings, despite its civil label, than the Court had before it in Hendricks.
124 Hendricks, 521 US at 364 (noting that if the state seeks to detain someone under the
statute for more than one year, a court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the "same
standards as required for the initial confinement" are met).
125 Id at 364.
126 The ordinance does provide for a one-year probationary period if the accused renounces
gang activity, Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(H), but there is no provision for ending
the banishment once a gang member is ordered to leave the city.
127 Hendricks, 521 US at 364-65 (noting that Kansas's choice to afford "procedural protec-
tions does not transform a civil commitment proceeding into a criminal prosecution").
128 Id at 364 (stating that the "numerous procedural and evidentiary protections afforded
[by Kansas] demonstrate that the Kansas legislature has taken great care to confine only a nar-
row class of particularly dangerous individuals, and then only after meeting the strictest proce-
dural standards").
129 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(E)-(F).
130 Hendricks, 521 US at 368.
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Therefore, the Court would be unlikely to let the civil denomination
of banishment stand even though it let civil confinement survive in
Hendricks.
Despite the Supreme Court's usual deference to legislative pref-
erence, civil banishment is "so punitive [ ] in purpose [and] effect""'
that courts should negate the civil label and classify the proceeding as
criminal. Furthermore, the Cicero Gang Free Zones Ordinance is dis-
tinguishable from recent Supreme Court cases, even Hendricks, that
have allowed serious punishments through civil hearings.
III. BANISHING GANG MEMBERS UNDER EXISTING
BANISHMENT LAW
Even if the enactors of an ordinance banishing gang members
properly classify the proceedings as criminal and provide the constitu-
tionally required procedural protections, banishment imposed on gang
members is unlikely to be upheld by courts. This Part discusses the
current state of banishment law with a focus on intrastate, rather than
interstate, banishment because the Cicero method (banishment from a
single community), is effecting an intrastate banishment. This Part ex-
amines the general reluctance of courts to uphold banishment condi-
tions. This Part then argues that banishing gang members should not
be allowed by courts under the existing law because it is not narrowly
tailored, it is unnecessarily severe and restrictive, and it merely pushes
gang members into other areas, creating dissension between neighbor-
ing communities.
A. Current Banishment Law
1. Interstate banishment.
Historically, banishment was a severe form of criminal punish-
ment used to rid communities of undesirable individuals." Banish-
ment reflects a community's view that it does not want to take the
time to rehabilitate an offender, or that it sees an offender as incapa-
ble of rehabilitation and that the community feels that its safety is best
served by expelling the offender from the community.7' At the federal
level, "[t]here is no banishment prohibition in the United States Con-
131 Ward, 448 US at 248-49.
132 Hendricks, 521 US at 369 (allowing potentially indefinite civil confinement for sexually
violent predators).
133 See text accompanying notes 98-101. See also Snider, 24 New Eng J on Crim and Civ
Confinement at 459-65 (cited in note 101) (discussing historical uses of banishment dating back
to the Codes of Hammurabi and the Old Testament).
134 See Snider, 24 New Eng J on Crim and Civ Confinement at 456 (cited in note 101) (dis-
cussing the penological bases for banishment).
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stitution," and banishment was not cruel and unusual punishment at
common law." However, the majority of federal and state courts that
have addressed interstate banishment have held it to be illegal,'3 and
at least fifteen state constitutions explicitly prohibit banishing people
from the state.' The majority of courts that have rejected interstate
banishment have found that it is not related to the rehabilitative and
deterrent goals of the criminal justice system and that it raises serious
interstate comity problems when one state "make[s] other states a
dumping ground for [its] criminals."'"
2. Intrastate banishment.
Despite the fairly uniform rejection of interstate banishment,
states do not agree on whether intrastate banishment may be imposed
as a criminal sentence or a condition of probation or parole."o Ban-
ishment cases are "uncommon,' 4 ' and the majority of states have not
addressed the intrastate banishment issue.'4 However, some states
have indicated a willingness to uphold intrastate banishment condi-
tions in limited circumstances'43 while others prohibit intrastate as well
135 Ray v McCoy, 174WVa 1,321 SE2d 90,95 (1984) (Miller concurring).
136 People v Baum, 251 Mich 187,231 NW 95,96 (1930) (discussing the fact that banishment
to criminal colonies was common in England).
137 Snider, 24 New Eng J on Crim and Civ Confinement at 466 (cited in note 101) (noting
that most state and federal courts addressing legality of interstate banishment have declared it il-
legal and discussing their reasons for doing so).
138 Id at 465 (discussing state prohibitions on banishing or exiling individuals from the
state).
139 Commonwealth v Pike, 428 Mass 393,701 NE2d 951, 960-61 (1998) (invalidating a con-
dition of probation prohibiting a party from entering Massachusetts during the period of his
probation). See also Baum, 231 NW at 96 (stating that "permit[ting] one state to dump its convict
criminals into another ... would tend to incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that
fundamental equality of political rights among the several states which is the basis of the Union
itself").
140 See Snider, 24 New Eng J on Crim and Civ Confinement at 470 (cited in note 101) (stat-
ing that most courts hold that any banishment sentence is illegal but that some courts have up-
held intrastate banishment conditions).
141 People v Harris, 238 Ill App 3d 575,606 NE2d 392,396 (1992) (noting that "banishment
cases are for the most part, uncommon").
142 A survey of state case law revealed that the following states have not addressed intra-
state banishment conditions: Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The District of Columbia has also
not addressed intrastate banishment conditions.
143 A survey of state case law reveals that Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Illinois,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Oregon, and Texas have considered intrastate banishment conditions and
upheld them in limited circumstances, or indicated a willingness to do so. See Beavers v State, 666
S2d 868,871 (Ala Crim App 1995) (holding that banishment from a county pursuant to a parole
condition was allowed because it was voluntarily accepted); Peratrovich v State, 903 P2d 1071,
1079 (Alaska Ct App 1995) (holding that before imposing condition banishing defendant from
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as interstate banishment."" When determining the validity of a ban-
his home, the judge must have good reasons for rejecting lesser restrictions); Jones v State, 727
P2d 6,7-8 (Alaska Ct App 1986) (holding that an area restriction must be connected to underly-
ing offense, must not be overly severe, and must be related to rehabilitation of the offender);
People v Watkins, 193 Cal App 3d 1686,1689 (1987) (upholding very narrow banishment condi-
tion because it was related to the defendant's crimes and preventing future criminality); People v
Beach, 147 Cal App 3d 612,620-23 (1983) (striking banishment condition that was not necessar-
ily rehabilitative and "was unreasonably broad in light of the desired goal"); In re White, 97 Cal
App 3d 141,147-52 (1979) (modifying and limiting banishment condition because there was "lit-
tle factual nexus" between condition and future criminality except in small area defendant was
banished from and the condition was unduly harsh); State v Collett, 232 Ga 668, 208 SE2d 472,
474 (1974) (upholding condition banishing the defendant from seven counties in Georgia for one
year, as there was no showing that the one-year period was unreasonable and no showing that
banishment was unrelated to the defendant's crime); United States v Cothran, 855 F2d 749,752-
53 (11th Cir 1988) (upholding banishment condition requiring defendant to stay out of Georgia
county because defendant could enter the county with permission);Adams v State, 2000 Ga App
LEXIS 35, *2 (holding that banishing defendant from several Georgia counties for thirty years
was not unreasonable); Sanchez v State, 234 Ga App 809,508 SE2d 185,186 (1998) (invalidating
sentence banishing defendant from state and noting that banishment from areas within Georgia
must be logically related to rehabilitation of the defendant); Wyche v State, 197 Ga App 148,397
SE2d 738, 739 (1990) (banishment from five county area of Georgia, for four-year period, not
unreasonable); Kerr v State, 193 Ga App 165,387 SE2d 355,359 (1989) (banishment permissible
if it is for a reasonable duration and bears logical relationship to the rehabilitative purpose of the
punishment); Parrish v State, 182 Ga App 247, 355 SE2d 682, 683-84 (1987) (defendant must
show that banishment is unreasonable or unrelated to rehabilitative purpose of sentence in order
to have banishment set aside); Edwards v State, 173 Ga App 589,327 SE2d 559,561 (1985) (ban-
ishment of convicted criminal from a county is a permissible condition of probation); Wilson v
State, 151 Ga App 501,260 SE2d 527, 530-31 (1979) (banishment not per se violative of public
policy and is within broad discretion of trial judge); In re J. G., 295 Ill App 3d 840, 692 NE2d 1226,
1229 (1998) (holding that geographical restrictions as condition of juvenile probation must be
reasonably related to the underlying crime and rehabilitation, and that in the instant case ban-
ishment had nothing to do with the "delinquent acts or rehabilitation"); People v Pickens, 186 Ill
App 3d 456,542 NE2d 1253,1257 (1989) (holding that probation condition imposing geographic
restriction from fifty block area was allowable because the probationer could obtain permission
to reenter the area for legitimate reasons and this "remove[d] the taint of banishment from the
restriction"); State v Holiday, 585 NW2d 68,70-71 (Minn Ct App 1998) (finding ordinance could
not allow for banishment of trespasser from all public housing because of overbreadth concerns);
Cobb v State, 437 S2d 1218, 1221 (Miss 1983) (upholding probation condition requiring proba-
tioner to remain 125 miles outside of the county in which he committed his crime); Martin v
Board of Parole and Post-prison Supervision, 327 Or 147, 957 P2d 1210, 1212, 1216-17 (1998)
(upholding condition barring defendant convicted of sexually abusing a child from entering most
of the victim's county); Owens v Board of Parole, 113 Or App 507,834 P2d 547,549 (1992) (hold-
ing that condition barring sex offender from entire county of victim was overbroad but indicat-
ing that more narrow restrictions would be allowed); State v Ferre, 84 Or App 459,734 P2d 888,
889-90 (1987) (same); State v Jacobs, 71 Or App 560, 692 P2d 1387, 1389 (1984) (invalidating
condition banishing probationer from entire town and holding that condition must be more
"narrowly drawn" to fit specific crime); Johnson v State, 672 SW2d 621, 623 (Tex Ct App 1984)
(holding that banishing defendant from county was not reasonably related to rehabilitation and
was unduly restrictive of defendant's liberty).
144 A survey of state case law reveals that Iowa and North Carolina have considered intra-
state banishment conditions and have essentially prohibited them. See Burnstein v Jennings, 231
Iowa 1280,4 NW2d 428,429 (1942) (holding that trial court had no right to order defendant to
stay out of county); State v Churchill, 62 NCApp 81,302 SE2d 290,292-93 (1983) (noting that a
North Carolina court has no power to issue a banishment sentence and that North Carolina de-
fines banishment broadly to include banishment from "a city, place, or country, for a specific pe-
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ishment order, courts typically look to at least three general factors.
First, the banishment must be "related logically to the rehabilitative
purposes of the sentence..'. Second, the prohibited area in the ban-
ishment condition must be tailored in some way to fit the underlying
crime.' ' Finally, the banishment condition cannot be "unnecessarily
severe and restrictive.""
Under these guidelines, the determination of the legitimacy of a
banishment condition is highly fact specific."' In cases of egregious
misconduct, such as sexual abuse of a child, courts tend to permit
more sweeping banishment conditions to protect past victims." Gen-
erally, courts seem to prefer banishment conditions barring individuals
from crime-ridden areas or locations frequented by past victims to
those prohibiting individuals from entering entire communities."
riod of time, or for life"); State v Setzer, 35 NC App 734, 242 SE2d 509, 511 (1978) (noting that
there is a well settled prohibition on banishment in North Carolina, but finding that restriction
from area in and around courthouse was not illegal banishment); State v Culp, 30 NC App 398,
226 SE2d 841, 842 (1976) (holding that condition requiring defendant to move his trailer home
constituted impermissible banishment from situs of trailer).
145 Sanchez, 508 SE2d at 186 (stating that banishment must be related to rehabilitative pur-
poses of a probation sentence). See also Commonwealth v Pike, 428 Mass 393, 701 NE2d 951,
959-60 (listing cases in which conditions banishing probationers from small geographic areas
were upheld because they "served the goals of probation" and noting that "banishment from a
large geographical area ... struggles to serve any rehabilitative purpose") (internal citations
omitted).
146 See Jones, 727 P2d at 8 (reversing condition of probation prohibiting the defendant from
being within a forty-five block area in part because there was no "clear nexus between the area
and [defendant's] misconduct"); Martin, 957 P2d at 1217 (upholding condition barring defendant
convicted of sexually abusing a child from entering most of the victim's county);Jacobs, 692 P2d
at 1389 (invalidating condition banishing probationer from an entire town because the condition
should have been "more narrowly drawn" to the offense).
147 Jones, 727 P2d at 8 (reversing condition of probation prohibiting the defendant from be-
ing within a forty-five block area in part because it was unreasonably restrictive). See also Holi-
day, 585 NW2d at 70 (construing a Minneapolis ordinance as banishing a trespasser from only a
few properties and not all public housing to avoid overbreadth concerns); Owens, 834 P2d at 549
(invalidating parole condition barring a sex offender from an entire county because the restric-
tion was unnecessarily broad to accomplish the goal of protecting the victim); Ferre, 734 P2d at
889-90 (reversing an order barring probationer from an entire county because it was broader
than necessary to protect the victims).
148 See Snider, 24 New Eng J on Crim and Civ Confinement at 472-73 (cited in note 101)
(noting that the "illegality of banishment turns upon the circumstances under which the condi-
tion is imposed").
149 See Cobb, 437 S2d at 1221 (upholding five-year probation condition requiring proba-
tioner to remain 125 miles outside of the county in which he shot his nephew); Martin, 957 P2d at
1216-17 (upholding condition barring defendant convicted of sexually abusing a child from en-
tering most of the victim's county).
150 See, for example, Holiday, 585 NW2d at 71 (invalidating an order banishing an individ-
ual from all public housing projects when he had only trespassed in one); Jacobs, 692 P2d at 1389
(banishment condition barring probationer from entire town should have been "more narrowly
drawn" to the offense and to protecting past victims).
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B. Banishment of Gang Members
Civil banishment effectively imposes an intrastate banishment of
gang members by ordering them to leave a town. This Part argues that
a court is unlikely to uphold such a condition under existing banish-
ment law.
First, banishment of gang members does not serve any rehabilita-
tive purpose. One could argue that removing gang members from a
town is likely to sever their ties to their gang and reduce the likeli-
hood that they will engage in further gang-related conduct. ' Civil
banishment, however, simply orders gang members to leave town and
does not rehabilitate them in any way or try to reduce their future
criminal behavior in other communities. On the other hand, this factor
is not dispositive because the cases requiring a rehabilitative purpose
have been in the probation context,' 2 where rehabilitation is clearly
the goal. Supporters could argue that the goal of civil banishment
measures, such as the Cicero ordinance, is not gang member rehabili-
tation but rather community protection and that banishing gang
members is therefore serving the underlying goals of the measures.'m
Second, banishment of gang members such as that effected by the
Cicero ordinance is not narrowly tailored geographically to match
gang members' offenses as required in most intrastate banishment
cases." A gang free zones ordinance simply banishes gang members
from the entire town, not only from specific areas where they engaged
in criminal behavior. A court is unlikely to uphold such a broad geo-
graphic restriction that is unrelated to specific offenses. For example,
there is no indication that the underlying criminal activity, required for
banishment under the Cicero ordinance,"" must be similar to the egre-
151 See Michael George Smith, Note, The Propriety and Usefulness of Geographical Restric-
tions Imposed as Conditions of Probation, 47 Baylor L Rev 571,586-87 (1995) (noting that ban-
ishing individuals from an area to get them out of the way serves no rehabilitative purpose but
that it "could break a chain of social contacts that has proven to cause criminal behavior in the
past"). Smith's argument that removing people from their established community may break so-
cial contacts that have facilitated criminal behavior may be particularly persuasive in the gang
context due to the potential problems gang members might face if there are only rival gangs in
the town in which they relocate. Consider Jeffrey Fagan, Gangs; Drugs; and Neighborhood
Change, in Huff ed, Gangs in America 39,41 (cited in note 14) (discussing that gangs have cer-
tain "turfs" and that fights are common among gangs). However, given the large number of
gangs, it is likely that many gang members will in fact be able to find a new gang to associate with
in the community that they move to and will continue to commit gang-related crime. Consider
James F Short, Jr., Foreword. Diversity and Change in U.S. Gangs, in Huff ed, Gangs in America
vii, xi (stating that "most gangs are neither very stable in membership [n]or very cohesive").
152 See note 145 and accompanying text.
153 See Slater, Suburb Gives Gang Members 60 Days to Leave, Austin American-Statesman
at A12 (cited in note 33) (quoting Cicero town president as stating that her "concern is protect-
ing the residents of the town of Cicero").
154 See text accompanying note 146.
155 Gang Free Zones Ordinance § 25-300(a)(G).
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gious crimes such as child sexual abuse and murder that have led
courts to uphold such broad geographic banishment conditions.'" For
this reason, a court is unlikely to uphold a broad banishment condi-
tion even to stop the serious threat of gang activity."n
Finally, a court is likely to find that banishment of gang members
is unnecessarily severe and restrictive. For example, overlapping with
the previous factor, the fact that banishment under the Cicero ordi-
nance is from the entire town makes the condition overly restrictive.
Furthermore, most banishment conditions allowed by courts are lim-
ited in duration," while banishment under the Cicero ordinance is
permanent. The ordinance contains no provision specifying a period of
time for the banishment and no provision for an excluded gang mem-
ber to seek readmission to the town. A final indication that the ban-
ishment condition is overly restrictive is that it does not allow the ban-
ished gang member to enter the town for any reason. 1"
In addition to these factors generally considered in determining
the legality of intrastate banishment conditions, the banishment of
gang members is unlikely to be upheld because it merely pushes gang
156 See text accompanying note 149.
157 The broad nature of the civil banishment of gang members from an entire town is one
feature that distinguishes it from the more narrowly tailored nuisance abatement injunctions
that have withstood a constitutional challenge in California. See notes 22,30, and accompanying
text. For example, unlike the broad provisions in the Cicero ordinance, nuisance abatement in-
junctions are focused on more specific behavior and on more targeted problem areas of the
community. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text;Werdegar, Note, 51 Stan L Rev at 416 (cited
in note 10) (noting that a city will identify and focus on a neighborhood "with an unusually high
crime rate that is known to be the turf of a particular urban street gang").The more narrow fo-
cus of nuisance abatement injunctions threatens the liberty interest of gang members less than a
broad banishment from an entire town, so a court is more likely to uphold an injunction against
a gang than a broad banishment condition exiling them from the entire town. Furthermore,
courts have traditionally issued nuisance abatement injunctions, see Werdegar, Note, 51 Stan L
Rev at 414 (stating that public nuisance doctrine is "centuries-old"), while they have traditionally
been reluctant to allow banishment, see notes 137-40 and accompanying text. This also makes
the nuisance injunctions easier to defend because a court seems more likely to use the estab-
lished public nuisance doctrine in innovative ways to combat gangs than it is to increase the use
of the generally disfavored banishment remedy.
158 Compare Bagley v Harvey, 718 F2d 921, 925 (9th Cir 1983) (holding that parole condi-
tion banishing defendant from the state of Washington was not cruel and unusual punishment
because the banishment was not permanent-defendant could return at the end of his parole
term), with Dear Wing Jung v United States, 312 F2d 73,76 (9th Cir 1962) (holding that condition
requiring alien to leave the United States was the equivalent of permanent banishment from the
United States and as such was "either a 'cruel and unusual' punishment or a denial of due proc-
ess of law").
159 This factor would likely be particularly persuasive in an Illinois court because Illinois
has held that allowing a probationer to enter a prohibited area for a legitimate reason "removes
the taint of banishment" from a condition. People v Pickens, 186 111 App 3d 456,542 NE2d 1253,
1257 (1989) (holding that a court may impose a condition barring a defendant from certain areas
if the banishment is reasonably related to the offense "provided that, if the defendant has a le-
gitimate and compelling reason to go to that area or place, he may apply to a specified authority
for specific permission" to do so).
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members into other regions, creating dissension between neighboring
communities. Typically, comity concerns are discussed in interstate
banishment cases.'+ However, the same principles apply to intrastate
banishment. When a town tries to "dump" gang members into sur-
rounding cities, serious problems between communities may arise if
gang members join new gangs and continue to commit gang-related
crimes in their new community.
6 1
Finally, banishment is unlikely to be upheld because of the likeli-
hood of enforcement along racial lines. In a comprehensive commen-
tary on banishment, one commentator argues that banishment should
be per se unconstitutional and recognizes as specific problems that
banishment may be used as a "vehicle of racial discrimination in cer-
tain cases" and as a "means of effecting the political makeup of a
[community]" by banishing minority citizens disproportionately and
redistributing votes.' For example, critics of the Cicero ordinance
have argued that it will work along racial lines.' While all criminal law
enforcement is open to attack as discriminatory, banishing citizens de-
prives them of the right to vote in future elections to change current
community policies and makes discretion particularly dangerous. Fur-
thermore, if a court in fact allowed banishment through the civil,
rather than criminal, justice system contrary to the argument in Part
II, the lack of procedural safeguards would likely lead to a higher rate
of wrongful convictions that would exacerbate the racial bias problem.
In light of these considerations and the factors generally used to
determine the legality of intrastate banishment conditions, a court is
unlikely to uphold the banishment of gang members.
CONCLUSION
Gang-related crime in America is staggering and communities are
understandably searching for new ways to control gang violence.
Communities are turning away from ineffective traditional criminal
law techniques and are looking to innovative civil methods to fight
gangs. The town of Cicero, Illinois has tried the novel measure of ban-
ishing gang members from the town pursuant to a civil administrative
hearing.
However, civil banishment imposes a criminal penalty through a
civil hearing and deprives gang members of important constitutional
160 See note 139 and accompanying text.
161 See Snider, 24 New Eng J on Crim and Civ Confinement at 456-57 (cited in note 101)
(stating that "if one is banished from one community, he is necessarily relegated to another [and]
[a]rguably, the community it which the offender now must reside will find him equally as repug-
nant as the one from which he was banished").
162 Id at 503-06 (discussing banishment as a means of political and racial oppression).
163 See note 53 and accompanying text.
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procedural protections. Despite the Supreme Court's strong prefer-
ence for deferring to the civil or criminal label affixed to statutes by
legislatures and the high burden of proof a challenger must meet to
overcome the legislative denomination, the civil banishment of gang
members is likely to transcend its civil legislative label.
Furthermore, even if Cicero provided the necessary procedural
protections and recognized the criminal nature of the ordinance,
courts would be unlikely to enforce the banishment of gang members
under existing banishment law. Banishment imposed on gang mem-
bers is not tailored in any way to a gang member's criminal behavior
but is instead an unnecessarily broad geographical restriction from the
entire town. Furthermore, banishment pushes gang problems into sur-
rounding communities and is prone to discriminatory enforcement
along racial lines.
While cities should pursue innovative ways to combat the serious
problems of gang-related crime, communities should not be allowed to
deprive gang members of criminal due process protections or to sim-
ply shift their problems into surrounding areas by banishing gang
members. Cities should pursue stepped-up enforcement of petty
crimes committed by gang members or nuisance abatement injunc-
tions that are more narrowly tailored than broad banishment from an
entire town to combat gang-related crime. The Cicero ordinance
should not be enforced and other communities should not enact simi-
lar measures.
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